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British High Court is for the Birds? Actually, for Twitter!

Again in the category of "you can’t really make this up," yesterday the High Court in Britain ordered an injunction served through Twitter – the social networking site.

Donal Blaney, a lawyer, runs a blog called Blaney’s Blarney. Another account, named blaneysbarney, was impersonating Blaney, a politically conservative blogger. Inspired by a case in Australia, where Facebook was used to serve a court order, Blaney asked the court to allow him to serve the anonymous Twitter-user with a court order using the very social network the imposter was using – Twitter! As a practical matter, the court order will only actually be served (i.e., the writ received) when that account owner logs in and accesses his or her account on Twitter.

Since access to British courts appeared much more facile than heading to California in the hopes that a U.S. court will deal with the issue and with Twitter in the United States, he opted to petition the High Court in Britain to allow him to serve the order using Twitter. In the United Kingdom, the law permits an injunction to be delivered through electronic means (e.g., telecopy or even email), so in principle, no new law has actually been created, although this is certainly a novel twist to the existing law – especially since the identity of the imposter account owner was not known to Blaney.

The British High Court agreed, noting that issuing the writ using the Tweeting facility appeared to be the best way to get to the individual behind the anonymous tweeting. As has been noted in Legal Bytes previously, obtaining the identity of anonymous account holders on social media networks can be difficult, with favorable results far from a certainty in all jurisdiction and legal venues.

In the Australian case reported last year, which did not involve impersonation, a couple in Australia defaulted on their mortgage with MKM Capital, but were successfully able to avoid being served with papers in person. They ignored emails and never showed up in court. So, a Supreme Court judge in Australia’s Capital Territory agreed to let MKM Capital serve papers over the Internet. Facebook profiles (you know, those great facts and tidbits you share with everyone in your social media network and the public) had birth dates, email addresses and all the information necessary to satisfy the judge that they could indeed communicate and contact the defendants using Facebook.

Getting back to the recent UK order, online impersonation of sports figures and entertainment celebrities has become an increasing problem and nuisance on social media networks, and Twitter has even reacted to the problem by allowing celebrity "Tweeters" to have their authenticity certified with an icon (similar to a "seal") that is attached to their real profile pages.

The ability to serve legal papers and court orders using digital means through social media – imagine serving my avatar in a virtual world – may have wide-ranging implications for bringing legal actions against those who seek to use anonymity or pseudonymity to insulate themselves from detection when engaging in inappropriate or illegal activities. That said, if the actual account owner is anonymous, how will we know who they are even after they are "served," unless the host or ISP is somehow bound by the service of process.

Stay tuned. Social media is turning the legal world upside down, too . . . let us know if we can help keep you upright. Contact me if you have questions about this or any other matters.

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Court Orders Google to Turn Over Blogger Identity Information

Earlier this week, New York State Supreme Court Judge Joan Madden ordered Google to turn over account information about an anonymous blogger to model Liskula Cohen in order to enable her to pursue a claim of defamation. The blogger had used Google’s blogging service to create a blog entitled “Skanks in NYC,” and had posted pictures and references to the model that were anything but flattering, and which, she claimed, lost potential opportunities for her. When Ms. Cohen originally sought to find out who had posted the content, predictably Google resisted, maintaining that its privacy policy does not permit the disclosure of the blogger’s account information.

To put this in perspective, the protection of free speech—especially anonymous speech—is a concept in American jurisprudence and history that traces its roots to Thomas Payne’s pamphlet, Common Sense. First published in 1776, it anonymously challenged the authority of Great Britain in the New World and is widely regarded as the first work to openly ask for independence for the Colonies from Britain.

Since then, state courts have varied on just how wide those rights go and for what purposes protection is appropriate. Although I am hardly a First Amendment lawyer or a Constitutional scholar, the legal issue still seems simple. If the speaker—anonymous or not—is expressing ideas or an opinion or belief, he or she is more likely to enjoy protection. While there are limitations on freedom of expression (e.g., yelling “fire” in a crowded theater), political expression has typically enjoyed greater protection than “commercial” speech—one being fundamental to a society’s encouragement of the free flow of ideas, the other designed to promote a product, service or brand in a free market economy. On the other side of the spectrum and generally not protected, would be public expressions that are clearly and solely intended to hurt someone, where actual harm can be shown from intentional or malicious public expression or, as was determined by the New York court here, where an illegal act was or was likely to have been committed—in this case, defamation.

While it is difficult to pinpoint a single factor that will always favor protection, anonymity is a strong legal shield U.S. jurisprudence holds dear to protect individuals from the potential swords of those in power, or from anyone who might seek to stifle dissent or ideas that might be unpopular. For example, in 2005, a blogger who ranted against a politician, accusing him of “obvious mental deterioration,” was ultimately protected by the Delaware Supreme Court expressing concern over the potential “chilling effect” on anonymous speech. The blogger in this case was referring to a politician, and the court ruled that in order to justify revealing the identity of an anonymous blogger, the plaintiff must provide evidence sufficient to all the elements of the claim if the case were to go to trial. Because the court concluded no reasonable person would believe the blogger’s statements to be factual, no action for defamation could be sustained, and the court dismissed the case. You can read the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in full right here, but clearly for bloggers, this represented a significant landmark and affirmation of the substantial protection afforded anonymous posting.

In a subsequent 2008 case, a Maryland Court of Appeals decision (Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Zebulon J. Brodie) similarly concluded that anonymous posts should be protected, and set out an approach first detailed in a New Jersey case (Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3) describing the steps judges should take in deciding whether to compel disclosure of anonymous online speakers in cases that come along in the future.

Unlike the previous cases, and potentially distinguishing this case, is the fact that the blogger here targeted Ms. Cohen intentionally, exclusively, and individually; and while the defendant argued the postings were just “trash talk” and only opinion, Judge Madden noted that if Ms. Cohen could prove the blogger’s statements were factually inaccurate, it would refute the argument that the posts were merely opinion and would support a legal claim of defamation.

As we have previously noted in Legal Bytes in articles describing the FTC’s efforts to regulate the blogosphere, and in presentations we have made, it is clear that online speech is coming under increased scrutiny, and that regulators and courts appear to nibbling away at the virtually complete immunity anonymous bloggers once seemed to enjoy, seeking to define the contours of what is or is not permissible conduct on the web. Does anyone remember the term “netiquette”?

For more information, or for assistance with issues like these or any social media, online, digital content, gaming or matters that meet at the crossroads of advertising, technology & media, look up Joseph I. Rosenbaum, send me an email, or contact the Rimon attorney with whom you regularly work. We are happy to help.

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Internet Privacy & Defamation – Mind Your ISPs & Qs

John Hines in our Chicago office is one of the authors of “Anonymity, Immunity and Online Defamation: Managing Corporation Exposures,” published in the Sedona Conference Journal and cited by the 7th Circuit. Earlier this month, the 9th Circuit rendered a decision many think may erode immunity accorded to ISPs, websites and services with defamatory content posted on their sites (Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com). But did you know that last week, the New Jersey Supreme Court rendered a significant decision recognizing a privacy interest in subscriber data which may impact corporations’ ability to pierce anonymity (State v. Reid). John has authored a Rimon Bulletin noting this extraordinary decision, departing from U.S. Constitutional standards and holding that the right to privacy extends to subscriber data in the possession of an ISP. The case involves a company that gave local police the IP address, registered to Comcast, of an employee on leave who visited a company supplier’s website, making unauthorized changes. After she was indicted, lawyers moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that without a valid subpoena, the employee’s expectation of privacy barred Comcast’s disclosure. New Jersey agreed, expressly extending its State “Constitutional” right of privacy to subscriber data provided to ISPs, noting “[u]sers make disclosures to ISPs for the limited goal of using that technology and not to promote the release of personal information to others.” Given the state of technology, the “IP addresses cannot be matched to an individual user without the help of an ISP,” and users have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Although the ruling is in the context of a criminal case, it will likely present challenges for corporations pursuing civil remedies and seeking to pierce the anonymity of individuals responsible for defamation and other speech torts. John and a team of Rimon lawyers know this area—reach out to him.